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MUST READ: 'THE RIGHTEOUS
WAR"
http://baltimorechronicle.com/Righteous_War_m
ar03.html
ANALYSIS FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
"The
Righteous War"
BY Immanuel
Wallerstein
Never has a war had so much prior discussion and so
little backing from world public opinion. No matter! The
decision for war, based on a calculus of American power was made
in the White House a long time ago. We have to ask ourselves
why.
George Bush
is about to lead the valiant troops into battle in righteous
war against the despotic tyrant. He will not turn back, no
matter what pusillanimous or venal European politicians, major
religious figures around the world, retired generals, and other
erstwhile friends of liberty and the US may think or do. Never
has a war had so much prior discussion and so little backing
from world public opinion. No matter! The decision for war,
based on a calculus of American power was made in the White
House a long time ago.
We have to ask ourselves why. To begin with, we have to lay
to rest two major theories about the motivations of the US
government that have been insistently put forth. The first is
that of those who favor the war. They argue that Saddam Hussein
is a vicious tyrant who presents an imminent danger to world
peace, and the earlier he is confronted the more likely he can
be stopped from doing the damage he intends to do.
The second theory is put forward primarily by opponents of
the war. They argue that the US is interested in controlling
world oil. Iraq is a key element in the edifice. Overthrowing
Hussein would put the US in the driver's seat.
Neither thesis holds much water. Virtually everyone around
the world agrees that Saddam Hussein is a vicious tyrant but
very few are persuaded he is an imminent danger to world peace.
Most people regard him as a careful player of the geopolitical
game. He is accumulating so-called weapons of mass destruction,
to be sure. But it is doubtful he would use them against anyone
now for fear of the reprisals.
He is certainly less likely, not more likely, to use them
than North Korea. He is in a tight political corner and, were
absolutely nothing done, he would probably be unable to move out
of it.
As for the links with Al-Qaeda, the whole affair lacks
credibility. He may play tactically and marginally with Al-Qaeda,
but not one-tenth as intensively as the US government did for a
long time. In any case, should Al-Qaeda grow stronger, he is
near the top of their list for liquidation as an apostate. These
charges of the US government are propaganda, not explanations.
The motives must be other.
What about the alternative view, that it's all about oil? No
doubt oil is a crucial element in the operation of the
world-economy. And no doubt the United States, like all the
other major powers, would like to control the oil situation as
much as it can. And no doubt, were Saddam Hussein to be
overthrown, there might be some reshuffling of the world oil
cards.
But is the game worth the candle? There are three things
about oil that are important: participating in the profits of
the oil industry; regulating the world price of oil (which has
such a great impact on all other kinds of production); and
access of supply (and potential denial of access to others).
In all three matters, the US is doing quite well right now.
US oil firms have a lion's share of the world profits at the
present time. The price of oil has been regulated to US
preferences most of the time since 1945, via the efforts of the
government of Saudi Arabia. And the US has a fairly good hold
on the strategic control of world oil supply.
If the Iraq war goes splendidly for the US, perhaps the US can
recuperate a little from the four geopolitical setbacks outlined
here. If the war goes badly, each negative will be immediately
reinforced.
In each of these three domains, perhaps the US position could be
improved. But can this slight improvement possibly be worth the
financial, economic, and political cost of the war? Precisely be
cause Bush and Cheney have been in the oil business, they must
surely be aware of how small would be the advantage. Oil can be
at most a collateral benefit of an enterprise undertaken for other
motives. So why then?
We start with the reasoning of the hawks. They believe that
the world position of the United States has been steadily
declining since at least the Vietnam War. They believe that the
basic explanation for this decline is the fact that US
governments have been weak and vacillating in their world
policies. (They believe this is even true of the Reagan
administration, although they do not dare to say this aloud.)
They see a remedy, a simple remedy. The US must assert itself
forcefully and demonstrate its iron will and its overwhelming
military superiority.
Once that is done, the rest of the world will recognize and
accept US primacy in everything. The Europeans will fall into
line. The potential nuclear powers will abandon their projects.
The US dollar will once again rise supreme. The Islamic
fundamentalists will fade away or be crushed. And we shall enter
into a new era of prosperity and high profit.
We need to understand that they really believe all of this,
and with a great sense of certitude and determination. That is
why all the public debate, worldwide, about the wisdom of
launching a war has been falling on deaf ears. They are deaf
because they are absolutely sure that everyone else is wrong,
and furthermore that shortly everyone else will realize that the
y have been wrong.
It is important to note one further element in the
self-confidence of the hawks. They believe that a swift and
relatively easy military victory is at hand-a war of weeks, not
of months, and certainly not of still longer. The fact that
virtually all the prominent retired generals in the US and the
UK have publicly stated their doubts on this military assessment
is simply ignored.
The hawks (almost all civilians) do not even bother to answer
them. One doesn't know, of course, how many US and UK generals
still in service are saying, or at least thinking, the same
thing.
The full-speed-ahead, torpedoes-be-damned attitude of the
Bush administration has already had four major negative effects
on the world position of the United States. Anyone with the most
elementary knowledge of geopolitics would know that, after 1945
, the one coalition the United States had to fear was that of
France, Germany, and Russia. US policy has been geared to
rendering this impossible. Every time there was the slightest
hint of such a coalition, the US mobilized to break away at
least one of the three. This was true when DeGaulle made his
early gestures to Moscow in 1945-46, and when Willy Brandt
announced the Ostpolitik.
There are all sorts of reasons why it has been quite
difficult to put together such an alliance. George Bush has
overcome the obstacles and achieved the realization of this
nightmare for the US For the first time since 1945, these three
powers have lined up publicly together against the US on a major
issue. US reaction to this public stand is having the effect of
cementing the alliance further. If Donald Rumsfeld thinks that
waving the support of Albania and Macedonia, or even Poland and
Hungary, in their face sends shivers up the spines of the new
trio, he must be very naive indeed.
The logical riposte to a Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis would be
for the US to enter into a geopolitical alliance with China,
Korea, and Japan. The US hawks are making sure that such a
riposte will not be easily achieved. They have goaded North
Korea into displaying its teeth of steel, offended South Korea
by not taking its concerns seriously, made China more suspicious
than before, and led Japan to think about becoming a nuclear
power. Bravo!
Then there's oil. Controlling the world price of oil is the
most important of the three oil issues mentioned earlier. Saudi
Arabia has been the key. Saudi Arabia has done the work for the
US for 50 years for a simple reason. It needed the military
protection of the US for the dynasty.
The US rush to war, its obvious ricochet effect on the Muslim
world, the open disdain of the US hawks for the Saudis, the
virtually full support for Sharon have led the Saudis to wonder,
out loud, whether US support is not an albatross rather than a
mode of sustaining them.
For the
first time, the faction in the royal house that favors loosening
its links with the US seems to be gaining the upper hand. The US
is not going to find easily a substitute for the Saudis.
Remember that the Saudis have always been more important for
US geopolitical interests than Israel. The US supports Israel
for internal political reasons. It has supported the Saudi
regime because it has needed them.
The US can survive without Israel.
Can it survive the political turmoil in the Muslim world
without Saudi support?
US administrations have been valiantly trying to stop nuclear
proliferation for fifty years. The Bush administration has
managed in two short years to get North Korea, and now Iran, to
speed up their programs, and not to be afraid to indicate this
publicly. If the US uses nuclear devices in Iraq, as it has
hinted it may, it will not merely break the taboo, but it will
ensure a speedy race of a dozen more countries to acquire these
devices.
If the Iraq war goes splendidly for the US, perhaps the US
can recuperate a little from these four geopolitical setbacks.
If the war goes badly, each negative will be immediately
reinforced.
I have been reading recently about the Crimean War, in which
Great Britain and France went to war against the Russian tyrant
in the name of civilization, Christianity, and the struggle for
liberty. A British historian wrote in 1923 of these motives:
"What Englishmen condemn is almost always worthy of condemnation
, if only it has happened."
The Times of London was in 1853 one of the strongest
supporters of the war. In 1859, the editors wrote their regret:
"Never was so great an effort made for so worthless an object.
It is with no small reluctance that we admit a gigantic effort
and an infinite sacrifice to have been made in vain."
When George Bush leaves office, he will have left the United
States significantly weaker than it was when he assumed office.
He will have turned a slow decline into a much speedier one.
Will the New York Times write a similar editorial in
2005?
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in 1976 to engage in the analysis of large-scale social change
over long periods of historical time.
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This story was published on March 5, 2003.
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